



THE LAW OF ESCAPE IN CIVIL ACTIONS.
(Continued from the June -Rowtpae, p. 358.)
III. WHO LIABLE FOR AN ESCAPE.
1. Tn general.-The liability rests prirmarilylp6n the superior.
The action for an escape shall be brought agaizwt him who Ras the
custody of the jail: 3 Com. Dig. 574. Though he has it de faqcto
only and not de jure : 2 Inst. 831-2. And it shall be against the
sheriff, not against his deputy; as the gaoler who takes care of
the prison in the county: 2 Inst. 382; Rol. Abr. 94,1. 30; sembh',
Hard. 34. But an action for an escape shall not be against the
superior, if the inferior be sufficient: 2 Inst. 382. But in all cases
where the inferior is insufficient, debt lies against the superior for
an escape: semble, Sir T. Jones 60; 1 Vent. 314; 2 Lev. 158; 9 Co.
98 a. If he be insufficient at the time of the action brought,
though he was sufficient at the time of the commitment or escape,
for that is the time most regarded: Sir T. Jones 61; 2 Lev. 160;
Com. Dig. 575.
If a jailer, who is the sheriff's servant, suffers a prisorier to
escape, the action must be brought against the sheriff, not against
the jailer. See 5 Mod. 414, 416; Ld. Raym. 424; Salk. 272;
where it is gaid in general that jailers are liable for escapes. But
this must be understood.of escapes in criminal cases for which
whoever de facto occupies the office of jailer is liable to answer;
nor is it material whether his title to the office be legal or not:
VOL. XXVI.-53 (417)
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Hale P. C.; 2 Ro. Rcp. 146; Hawk. P. C., c. 19, § 28; and see
Hard. 29-to 35, that where actions are said to lie against jailers
such absolute jailers are intended as writs are directed to. The
sheriff is answerable civiliter, though not criminaliter, for the acts
of his officers; their acts are by intendment of law his acts. But
though not liable criminaliter, that is, not liable to be indicted for
the acts of his officers, he is liable in a penal action for them:
Sturnty q. t. v. Smith, 11 East 25; Stanway q. t. v. Perry, 2 B.
& P. 157 ; 3 Bac. Abr. 408.
The United States marshal is not liable for the escape of a
debtor committed to a state jail, under process from the United
States courts: Randolph v. Donaldson, 9 Cranch 76. If by. a
state statute a fraudulent debtor is liable to imprisonment, and the
sheriff, suffer him to escape, the sheriff is liable and the action may
beb 'ought in the United States Circuit Court: fewster v. Spald-
iV#; . McLean 24. The sheriff is liable for the escape of a party
taken in execution, in a civil action, and legally in his custody,
thduglh there be no jail in the county: Gwinn v. Hubbard, 3
Blackf& (Ind.) 14.
2. Preceding or succeeding 8heriff.-Where a new sheriff is
appinted, his predecessor should deliver over by indenture (for
which see form, Dalt. Sheriff 18) all the prisoners in his custody,
charged with their respective executions; for the prisoners, until
tli~y are turned over to the new sheriff, remain in the custody
of the old sheriff, and if he omit to deliver them over, every
omission 'will be deemed an escape, wherewith he will be charge-
able: Hob. 266; 2 Rol. Abr. 457; Cro. Eliz. 365; Bulst. 70;
4 Co. 72; Bac. Abr. 406. But if the sheriff dies during his
shlievalty; the new sheriff, as soon as he is appointed, must take
nbtice of all persons in custody, and of the several executions with.
which they are charged; and this he must do out of necessity, for
there being nobody to inform him, he must himself take notice
thereof at his peril: 3 Co. 72. In England, by statute (3 Geo. 1,
e. 15f § 8), the duties of sheriff are, in such case, to be executed
by the under-sheriff until a successor is appointed. If a new
sheriff receive a prisoner from his predecessor, he is bound to
detain him, although a voluntary escape may have taken place in
the time of his predecessor: Rawson v. Turner, 4 Johns. 469, g.
Even where in such case the prisoner voluntarily returned to jail,
and being found there by a succeeding marshal, was detained by
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him: Held, that had he not done so it would haye been an escape:.
Grant v. Souther, Strange 423. In such case it mast be pre-
sumed that the former sheriff consented to receive the prisoner:
Drake v. Chester, 2 Conn. 473. The old sheriff will remain liable
if he omits to deliver any prisoner by indenture to the new: Vide
County (B. 3) Com. Dig. 575. But now a notice'in writing, not
by indenture, or by parol, is sufficient, if the new sheriff do not.
object: Watson on Sheriff 20; Sewell on Sheriff 29; and in New
York, by 1 R. S. 416, § 62 (5th ed.), if the former sheriff refuses to
deliver possession to the new sheriff, or to the person appointed to
discharge the duties of the office, -he will be guilty of a misde-
meanor. If the old sheriff omits to assign his prisoners within
ten days after notice, and a prisoner go at'large, it is an escape:
Hinds v. Doubleday, 21 Wend. 223. See also Partridge v. Wes:
tervelt, 13 Wend. 500; French v. Willett, 4 Bos. 649; 10 Abb.
Pr. 99.
3. Sheriff'8 liability for deuty.-If the jailer, who is thd
sheriff's deputy, suffers .a prisoner to escape, the action must be
brought against the sheriff. Vide 5 Mod. 414-416; Ld. Raym.
424. An escape. from the custody of a deputy sheriff may be
declared on as an escape from the sheriff: Skinner v. White, 9 N.
H. 204. Where a sheriff has returned non est to a eapias" ad
satisfariendum, and his deputy had the prisoner in custody before
the return day on another capias ad satisfaciendum, and allowed
him to escape, though neither knew of the writ in the hands of the
other (Wheeler v. Hambright, 9 S. & R. (Pa.) 390), the sheriff
Jias been held liable. But in what cases at common law and upon
the statute of West. 2, e. 11, the rule of respondeat superior will
hold, vide 2 Inst. 382, 466; 9 Co. 98; T. Jon. 60; 2 Lev. 1 8;
Vent. 314; 2 Mod. 119; 3 Keb. 591, 656, 701, 754, 758, 773;
Noy 69, Comb. 95. By the 8 & 9 W. 3, c. 27, s. 11, it was
enacted that the marshal of the King's Bench prison and the
warden of the Fleet "shall be answerable, and the profits and afore-
said inheritances of the said several offices shall be sequestered,
seized or extended to make satisfaction for such forfeitures, escapes
or misdemeanors respectively, as if permitted, suffered or committed
by the person or persons themselves, or either of'them," &c. To
render the sheriff liable for the acts of his deputy, irrespective
of statute,.such acts must have been done in the regular course
of his official business: Perkins v. Pitman, 34 N. H. 261; Stevens
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v. Colby, 46 Id. 163. With that proviso, the sheriff is civilly liable
for any act or acts of his deputy: Clute v. aoodell, 2 McLean
193; Lawrence v. Sherman, Id. 488; ffarrington v. Fuller, 18
Me. 277 ; 11a8on v. Ide, 20 Vt. 697 ; Buck v. Ashley, 37 Id. 475.
Also, Knowlto v. Bartlett, 1 Pick. 270; and the English case
of Cook et al. v. Palmer, 6 B. & C. 739. Asheriff is liable in
trespass for the acts of his deputy, and they may be sued jointly:
King v. Orser, 4 Duer 431.
4. Liability of deputy.-If the sheriff directs his warrant to his
bailiff, and afterwards J. S. puts in his own name as. special bailiff,
and thereupon arrests the defendant, who escapes, here J. S. shall
only be chargeable, and not the sheriff, because the defendant was
never in the sheriff's custody, but only in the custody of J. S.:
Cro. Eliz. 745; Dalt. Sheriff 560. It has been repeatedly holden
that where a special bailiff is appointed on the nomination of the
plaintiff in the action, the sheriff is not. answerable for the acts
of such bailiff: De Moranda v. Dunkin, 4 Term Rep. 120 ; 3 Bac.
Abr. 408. So if a writ comes to tlie sheriff and he makes out his
mandate to the bailiff of a liberty, who takes the party and after-
ward suffers him .to escape, an action lies against the bailiff of the
franchise, and not against the sheriff. Vide- Rol. Abr. 98, 99;
Bro. .Escape 40; N6y 27. And if the bailiff in such case remove
the party to the county jail, situate out of the liberty, and there
deliver him into the custody of the sheriff, he will subject himself
to an action for an escape: Boothman v. Earl of Surrey, 2 Term
Rep. 5.
So where a ca ia8 ad satisfaciendum was awarded to the sheriff
of Berks to arrest J. S., who then was in custody of the mayor and
burgesses of W., and thereupon the. sheriff made a warrant to the
mayor; &c., to take him, and afterwards they let him escape, it
was clearly held, that the mayor, &c., and not the sheriff, were
chargeable with the escape: Cro. Eliz. 26. The modern cases do
not appear to be numerotis where the sheriff is wholly exonerated
from liability. Primarily he would, in most cases, be liable, though
even where the sufficiency of the inferior is pleaded, in an action
against the superior, the verdict in order to bind the superior must
find the insufficiency of the inferior when the action was brought,
and not merely his insufficiency when he was keeper, or at the time
of the commitment or escape: Sir T. Jones 61; 1 Vent. 3 4; 2 Lev.
160; 3 Com. Dig. 575. In Salk. 18, Lord hALE is reported to
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have drawn a clear distinction between the liability of the sheriff
and his deputy; thus he says, "the deputy is not chargeable as an
officer, but as a wrongdoer, that for a voluntary escape an action
lies against the deputy, for it is in the nature of a rescue; but for
a negligent escape the action lies only against the sheriff." And
with this agrees SKINNER, C. J., in the case of .Rutcinson v.
Parkhurst, 1 Aik. 258, who says: "In England no action for
neglect of duty will lie against a deputy sheriff, though such officer
is liable for a tort committed by him. The distinction is that for
misfeasance the deputy is liable as well as the sheriff, but for non-
feasanee the action must be against the sheriff." In Massachusetts
the sheriff hnd deputy cannot be sued jointly for a tort done by the
deputy alone: Oampbell v. Philps, 1 Pick. 62. And in Btk v.
Ashley, 37 Vt. 477, POLAND, C. J., in referring to Hutchinson v..
Parkhurst, and Lord HALE'S dictum, says, "that case goes on to
decide that under our statute the respective liabilities of the sheriff
and his deputies are the same as held in the English law." See
also Clute v. Goodell, 2 McLean 193; State v. Moore, 19 Mo.
369 ; Murrell v. Smith, 2 Dana (Ky.) 462 ; Owen v. Gatewood, 4
Bibb (Ky.) 494 ; Watson v. Todd, 5 Mass. 271 ; .Perley v. Roster,
9 Id. 112; Newton v. Bradford, 13 Id. 114; Congdon v. Cooper,
15 Id. 10; Jentry v. Hunt, 2 McCord (S. C.) 410; Hazard v.
Israel, 1 Binn. (Pa.) 240.
5. Remedy against party escapig.-It was formerly held that
where the sheriff suffered a prisoner in execution to make a volun-
tary escape, the prisoner was in such case absolutely discharged
from the creditor, and that the right of action was entirely trans-
ferred against the sheriff, who by means of such escape became
debitor ex delicto : Arundell v. Wytham, Leon. 73 ; s. P. per IIo-
BART, in the Sheriff of BEssex's Case, Hob. 202. But later deci-
sions have been contrary, and it has since been adjudged that where
a sheriff suffered a voluntary escape, the plaintiff might have a new
action of debt or seire facias quare executionem non against the
prisoner: Allanson v. Butler, Sid. 330 ; Buxton v. Home, Show.
174; Basset v. Salter, 2 Mod. 136; James v. eirce, Vent. 269,
and numerous other cases: 3 Bac. Abr. 403.
But statute 8 & 9 W. 3, c. 26, sect. 7, placed the matter
beyond a doubt in enacting, aftdr abolishing all distinctions between
vuluntary and permissive escapes with regard to the plaintiff's rem-
edy, "that if any prisoner, who is or shall be committed in execu-
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tion to either of the said respective prisons, shall escape from thence
by any ways or means howsoever, the creditor or creditors, at whose
suit such prisoner was charged in execution at the time of his escape,
shall or may retake such prisoner by any new capias or capias ad
satisfacien dum, or sue forth any other kind of execution on the judg-
ment, as if the body of such prisoner had never been taken in execu-
tion." Therefore where to a 8cirefaciaa quare executionem non upon
a judgment the defendant pleaded, that he was formerly taken in
execution upon a eapias ad satisfaciendum upon the same judgment
and the sheriff suffered him to escape, to which escape the plaintiff
then and there consented, this was held a bad plea, for the assent
will not make it an escape with the consent of the plaintiff, and
therefote he has either his remedy against the sheriff or may retake
the party: ;cott v. Pecock, Salk. 271; Show. 174; adjudged on
the like plea, 3 ]3ac. Abr. 409-10. But if such prisoner be de-
livered out of execution by the sheriff or jailer with the assent of
him at whose suit lie is in execution, he shall not by color of this
judgment take him again and put him in prison. So if the execu-
tion creditor consent that one of the bail shall- be delivered *out of
execution, lie shall not take the other: 2 Leon. 260. Or that one
defendant only shall be delivered out of execution on a joint capias
ad satisfaciendurn: Style 387 ; Clarke v. Clement, 6 T. R. 525.
So where the prisoner has been discharged upon terms which are
not afterwards complied with: 'Figers v. Aldrioh, 4 Burr. 2482;
or to render himself on a given day, if he did not in the meantime
pay the debt, Clarke v. Clement, supra; or to pay the debt at a
future time, Tanner v. Hague, 7 T. R. 420; and on failure, that
he should be taken in execution again: Blackburn v. &upart, 2
East 243. Or Where the consent was that prisoner should come to
a tavern out of the rule: Style 117. In these and such like
cases the prisoner, it was held, could not be again taken in execu-
tion for the same matter. Although a sheriff is excused for not
arresting a person exempted by law from arrest on civil process,
he is not bound to take notice of this privilege: People v. Campbell,
40 N. Y. 133. But when once in custody such privilege cannot
be pleaded in bar to an action for escape:I Gill v. Mine, 18
Ohio St. 182.
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